Do U.S. Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Maduro's Criminal Case?

The recent U.S. military action in Venezuela, in which U.S. forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores on January 3, 2026 and transported them to the United States to stand trial in the Southern District of New York, raises a plethora of domestic and international legal issues.  These complex issues involve Venezuelan sovereignty, the legality of the use of force, potential head-of-state immunity, and the scope of executive power absent Congressional authorization.  The action has been condemned by various members of Congress and multiple foreign governments, and the U.N. Security Council has been in session over the ensuing crisis.  

Interestingly, under longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent known as the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, U.S. courts have jurisdiction over Maduro and Flores, notwithstanding the highly irregular manner in which they were brought to this country.  Issues of international law and Congressional authority do not affect the courts' jurisdiction. 

The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine derives its name from the Supreme Court cases Ker v. Illinois (1886) and Frisbie v. Collins (1952).  Under the Doctrine, which remains in effect, U.S. courts have jurisdiction over criminal defendants irrespective of the manner in which the defendant has been brought before them. The Doctrine holds that once a defendant is physically present before the court, due process is satisfied so long as trial procedures comply with constitutional safeguards. Historically, the doctrine has been applied broadly, insulating prosecutions from challenges based on extraterritorial apprehensions, despite concerns about sovereignty, implied extradition treaty obligations, and international law.  Ker involved an abduction from Peru by a private detective on behalf of the State of Illinois, and Frisbie a domestic abduction by state law enforcement agents across state lines.  Nevertheless, federal trial and appellate courts have regularly applied the Doctrine to U.S. Government abductions conducted in foreign nations.

The issue reached the Supreme Court again in United States v. Alvarez-Machain (1992).  Operatives hired by the U.S. Government had captured the accused in Mexico, and brought him  to California for trial.  The Ninth Circuit ruled that the Doctrine was inapplicable because there was an extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, reasoning that such a treaty necessarily prescribed the exclusive procedure for lawful transfer. The Supreme Court reversed and reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, this time specifically in a case involving abduction from a foreign country by U.S. Government operatives.  The extradition treaty did not expressly prohibit abduction, and the Supreme Court declined to infer such a restriction, notwithstanding protests by the Government of Mexico.  

The Noriega Case

Maduro is not the first de facto ruler to be abducted and brought to the United States for trial. In 1990, Manuel Noriega, at the time the de facto ruler of Panama, was forcibly removed from power during a U.S. military invasion and brought to the United States to face drug trafficking charges in Florida.  He claimed that as a head-of-state, he was entitled to immunity from prosecution.  The U.S. District Court rejected Noriega’s claim, noting that the U.S. had never recognized him as Panama’s legitimate leader, and that his charged criminal acts were personal, not official. Citing the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, the District Court found it had jurisdiction despite the manner of Noriega's apprehension.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Noriega's conviction.

The United States (among many other nations) does not recognize Maduro as Venezuela's legitimate head-of-state.  Courts ordinarily defer to the Executive Branch on this issue.

The Toscanino Dictum

There is dictum in United States v. Toscanino (2d Cir. 1974), to the effect that an exception to Ker-Frisbie could be found if the circumstances of the apprehension shock the conscience of the court.   For example, such a circumstance could exist if there was torture or extreme brutality, which would violate due process.  That dictum remains a theoretical construct, as there is no known instance in which a federal court has dismissed charges or released a defendant based on such circumstances – not even in the Toscanino case.  Moreover, several Circuit Courts of Appeal have expressly rejected any such exception.