ALPR Update: Recent Developments in ALPR Standing

The latest development with respect to statutory standing under California’s Automated License Plate Recognition Act (“ALPR Act”) is positive for ALPR operators and end-users in the State of California. The California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District in Mata v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc., 121 Cal. App. 5th 1075 (2026) addressed whether a person “who alleges a violation of the ALPR statute but identifies no resulting harm—other than his own subjective belief that his privacy has been invaded by the collection and storage of his data—has standing to sue under the ALPR statute.” The court concluded “the answer is no”—actual harm is required for statutory standing. 

The ALPR Act is one of several state privacy statutes that has caught the attention of the plaintiff bar in recent years. The statute authorizes “an individual who has been harmed by a violation of this title” to assert an ALPR Act claim against “a person who knowingly caused the harm.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.90.54(a). Plaintiff attorneys have latched onto this provision, filing putative class action lawsuits against ALPR operators and end-users, seeking statutory damages and attorneys’ fees, where there is no evidence of any purported harm. Mata is one such case.   

In Mata, the plaintiff asserted a single cause of action for violation of the ALPR Act against Digital Recognition Network, Inc. (“DRN”), an ALPR operator. Plaintiff argued DRN had collected his license plate information in violation of the statute because even though DRN maintained an ALPR usage and privacy policy on its website, DRN had “implemented the policy only ‘to maintain the appearance of adhering’ to the law” and the policy itself was not posted “conspicuously” on DRN’s website as required. The Mata court did not decide whether DRN had violated the ALPR Act. It instead affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment in DRN’s favor on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to establish actual harm and thus lacked standing to assert a claim. 

The holding in Mata is in line with other cases finding a mere statutory violation is insufficient to establish standing under the ALPR Act. See Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 5th 438, 448 (2026), rev. denied (May 13, 2026) (standing “require[s] harm beyond a mere statutory violation”); Navarro v. Data, No. 2:20-CV-07370-SVW-SK, 2022 WL 18280359, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2022) (“[r]equiring plaintiffs to show actual harm and a knowing violation”). However, tension remains with Bartholomew, the First Appellate District’s decision earlier this year, in which the Court of Appeals held an ALPR’s operator’s failure to post an ALPR policy was sufficient for statutory standing because it violated the public’s “right to know” that an ALPR system is in use. The Mata court expressed skepticism of Bartholomew’s “right to know” harm but declined to address the issue because “there [was] no dispute DRN implemented and made publicly available a usage and privacy policy” with the statutorily-required information. It thus remains an open question whether standing would exist where an ALPR operator or end-user has an ALPR policy that does not contain the information required by the ALPR Act. See Bartholomew, 118 Cal. App. 5th at 449 n.10 (“We express no opinion as to whether collecting and maintaining ALPR information with a usage and privacy policy that does not include every component identified in section 1798.90.51, subdivision (b)(2) would also cause such harm.”).